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The China Syndrome: The
International Trade Commission’s
Rising Importance For Enforcing
International Trade Secret Violations
By Jonathan R.K. Stroud

T

he Chinese have a saying that, roughly translated,
means “four faces, eight places.”1 While the meaning
is difficult to translate, it effectively means everything

is connected in all directions. Under one interpretation for
every line of communication, you have two points on a grid,
and thus with each new user, your web is multiplied. Thus,
four faces, eight directions, and (under a strained interpretation) exponential growth.
Jonathan R.K. Stroud, a former Patent
Examiner for ive years at the USPTO,
is a current fourth-year evening
law student at American University
Washington College of Law. His views
are his alone.
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Similarly, our modern business world grows exponentially more interconnected with the Chinese business world
with each new entrant onto the World Wide Web. Business
relationships multiply exponentially, and so do the opportunities for malfeasance.
To ask a trick question: What do the names Yu Xiang
Dong,2 Hong Meng,3 Shanshan Du,4 Kexue Huang,5 David
Yen Lee,6 and Hanjuan Jin7 have in common? hey are all
Chinese, but that is not the deeper answer. Tellingly, all
six of these individuals igure prominently in President
Barak Obama’s new strategy on mitigating the thet of U.S.
trade secrets, appearing as six of the seven examples in the
recently released strategic report, complete with price tags
attached to how valuable the misappropriated trade secrets
were or would have been.8 While not mentioning China
speciically, the message is manifest—the Administration
www.fdli.org
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broader exclusion order of all products that have beneitted from any
alleged trade secret misappropriation.
Litigants seeking to protect the U.S.
against unfair importation of generic versions of patented medicines,
biologics, and medical devices should
consider the forum when dealing with
international parties and pirated intellectual property.

Background
A. The International Trade
Commission
he ITC is an independent, quasijudicial federal agency with broad
investigative responsibilities on matters
of trade.17 here are six commissioners,
with no more than three Democrats or
Republicans, although there have been
independents in the past.18 Commissioners are appointed to a nine-year
term by the President as approved by
the Senate.19
As others have noted, 20 section
337 parallels section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 21 and broadly declares unlawful unfair methods
of competition and unfair acts in the

importation and/or sale of imported
articles. The ITC administers section
337. In running Intellectual Property-Based Import Investigations (337
investigations), the USITC employs
six full-time administrative law
judges to preside over these trial-like
proceedings.

B. The Law of Trade Secrets
at the ITC
he International Trade Commission
has stated unequivocally that “there
is no question that misappropriation
of trade secrets, if established, is an
unfair method of competition or unfair
act which falls within the purview of
Section 337.”22 To support this discussion, it is important to delve into the
historical and legal underpinnings of
trade secret doctrine.
Trade secret law emanates from a
provision of Roman law that sought
to protect information Roman slaves
might disclose to competitors.23 “he
law governing protection of trade secrets essentially is designed to regulate
unfair business competition.”24 he tort
of misappropriation of trade secrets
seeks to provide a remedy for acts of

Compare the ITC’s tracking of total 337 investigations:

Number of 337 Investigations 26
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believes the Chinese thet of trade
secrets is on the rise, and is ramping up
eforts to address the perceived surge.
Enter the U.S. International Trade
Commission (ITC). he ITC has become
an increasingly popular forum for business litigators in recent years.9 With severe remedies against importers of goods
and a theoretical one-year-turnaround
time,10 it has several advantages—both
procedural and substantive—than make
it an attractive forum for important business-to-business intellectual property
disputes. Commentators and litigators
oten overlook the ITC’s broad mandate, however, focusing only on patent
infringement claims, which are governed
by subsection (a)(B).11 Indeed, nearly the
entire ITC’s docket dating back to the
renaming of the Commission in 1974
consists of patent-centric litigation.
Yet the governing statute—and thus
the forum itself—is far broader than
just subsection (a)(B).12 It “stops parties
engaging in unfair competition from
importing into the U.S. It includes both
statutory IP like patents, copyrights,
and trademarks—as well as state-lawbased IP—such as trade secrets. When a
foreign company practices what would
be an unfair violation under U.S. , not
the company’s domestic laws, the U.S.
Congress excludes that company’s goods
from the U.S.”13
hus “unfair acts” that “destroy
or substantially injure” an “industry
in the United States lead to exclusion.”14 Unlike subsections (a)(B)–(E)
(trademarks, patents, trade dress,
copyrights), subsection (A) touches all
other federal and state-based “unfair
acts” and does not require the same
level of proof that the complainant is
a “domestic industry.”15 his draws
criticism from international free
trade advocates16 and allows for a far
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(Figures included through 2011.) With similar indings for trade secret
investigations:

Number of 337 Trade Secret Investigations
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(*Through Jan. 2013. Notably, in January of 2013 alone the Commission has already instituted
two trade-secret-only investigations, and more can be expected soon.)

unfair competition against companies
acting in good faith, and balances the
rights of the employer to the fruits
of his capital investment with the
interests of the laborer in mobility and
retention of personal skills.25

C. ITC Trade Secret Cases
By my count, there have been 39
instituted investigations that have
formally included Trade Secret in the
complaint. Of those cases, only a handful did not settle and only a tiny subset
of those decided signiicantly comment
on the law of ITC trade secret violations. Only a handful primarily pled
trade secrets violations (although that
number rose dramatically early this
year), and due to the primacy of patent
violations few rulings have survived
settlement, consent order, or dismissal.
hus, the record and precedential body
for ITC trade secret law (and the resulting literature) is quite sparse.
he signiicant cases and some statistics breaking down any discernible
trends follow.
As practitioners rediscover this
underutilized cause of action, that
number may grow in the coming
years, particularly ater the Federal
12
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Circuit’s decision in Tianrui ixed a
spotlight on the cause of action, arguably expanding the jurisdiction for the
action to include violations that occur
entirely outside of the United States.

D. TianRui Grp. Co. v. U.S.
International Trade
Commission
Recently, the Federal Circuit made
waves when it upheld the Commission’s decision to exclude goods
based on a trade secret violation,
where the theft happened in China. 28
There, Amsted Industries—an
American manufacturer of cast steel
railway wheels—licensed a discontinued secret process to a Chinese
foundry. Amsted also developed and
used its own newer process domestically. Meanwhile, a Chinese manufacturer, TianRui Group Co. Ltd.
and TianRui Group Foundry Co.
Ltd. (collectively, TianRui), hired a
number of employees from the licensed foundry and shortly thereafter produced wheels using the same
method originally licensed, violating
U.S. domestic trade secret protection. TainRui then sought to import
those wheels into the U.S. The ITC

excluded those wheels, and the Federal Circuit upheld the exclusion.
TianRui appropriately recognized the
ITC’s charter to seek out unfair trade
practices and protect those American
industries afected by them. Amsted’s
licensing of a competing trade secret to
a foreign corporation provided ample
evidence establishing a domestic industry—one that was undeniably injured
domestically by the misappropriation of
a valuable trade secret that allowed TianRui to compete in the domestic market.
he parties did not dispute that
the acts of misappropriation occurred
entirely in China. Following a trial
before an administrative law judge,
the Commission ultimately found
that TianRui violated section 337 and
issued exclusion and cease and desist
orders barring the subject TianRui
wheel parts from entry in to the U.S.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit afirmed the Commission’s determination. he majority found that Section
337 focuses on the nexus between
the imported articles and the unfair methods of competition rather
than on where the misappropriation
occurs: the determination of misappropriation was merely a predicate to
the charge that TianRui committed
unfair acts in importing its wheels
into the United States. In other words,
the Commission’s interpretation of
section 337 does not, as the dissent
contends, give it the authority to “police Chinese business practices.”29 It
only sets the conditions under which
products may be imported into the
United States.

E. Rubber Resins
he ITC has instituted four solely
trade-secrets-focused investigations
since the 2011 Federal Circuit decision
in TianRui. he irst, iled less than 8
www.fdli.org
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months later, was Rubber Resins and
Processes for Manufacturing Same.30
he complainant SI Group, Inc., a
chemical rubber tackiier manufacturer, iled against multiple respondents
from China, Hong Kong, and Canada
(collectively, Sino Legend).31
here, SI Group, Inc. accuses Sino
Legend of hiring away one of SI
Group’s plant managers from one of
SI’s wholly-owned Chinese subsidiaries. hat manager, SI Group alleges,
misappropriated and disclosed some
of SI Group’s chemical processes,
which were trade secrets, to Sino
Legend. he alleged misappropriation,
occurring entirely within a foreign jurisdiction, was of a chemical formula
to create superior rubber tackiiers, a
substance important in tire production. 32 he 60-page complaint includes
facts stretching back to 2004. 33 On
June 20, 2012, the Commission, instituted an investigation. Discovery is
ongoing and the trial should begin in
February 2012.
Additionally, the two cases iled in
2013, Robotic Toys and Components
hereof and Paper Shredders, Certain
Processes for Manufacturing or Related
to Same represent a trend of ilings
directed toward Chinese companies
based on trade secret violations.

F. Discovery Advantages/
Disadvantages
Trade secret litigation at the ITC is
high-risk, high-reward. It is high risk
mostly because litigators have been
reticent prior to TianRui to bring a
case solely on a trade secret violation
(or even in addition to an underlying
patent claim, for that matter), and so
the law is uncertain and there is little
precedential opinion to follow. And
trade secret litigation is high-reward
because, as many commentators have
FDLI

said, it provides a “powerful remedy
against misappropriation.”34
Despite the relative discomfort
litigators have shown for doing so,
pursuing trade secret violations at
the ITC can be the far wiser litigation
choice for companies, because it can
do a number of things normal state
court trade secret litigation cannot.
A successful ITC determination oten
results in a prospective nationwide
exclusion order, severely limiting the
usefulness of any trade secrets misappropriated by foreign companies by
denying them access to the largest
market in the world for their ill-gotten
goods. With experienced and efective
counsel arguing the case, exclusion
orders can encompass even products
that do not directly incorporate the
trade secret misappropriated abroad.
The ITC also affords a number of
procedural and substantive advantages that should make the ITC a
more attractive forum for parties
seeking to protect business and trade
secret investment. Lastly, even interdomestic parties should consider the
ITC as against U.S.-based competitors
who still largely import their goods
from abroad.
First, TianRui ills a gap in international enforcement. As many have
commented, dealing with foreign
defendants can be diicult because of
a wide array of procedural, substantive, and practical problems. For
one, service of process can be nearly
impossible, even under the Hague
Convention (to which, for instance,
Taiwan is not a party). For another,
there can be little practical efect for
summons or motions to compel. It
may be diicult to obtain discovery,
and costly as well. And even if a client
is successful, the foreign jurisdiction

may ultimately refuse to enforce any
resulting U.S.-based order. 35 hus, it
may be impossible to reach a foreign
bad actor at all using traditional
forums. And substantively, if the acts
occurred abroad, the above-mentioned “presumption against extraterritorial application” as well as the
machinations of civil procedure may
render the claim moot. Now, those
businesses with a colorable claim to
trade secret violations and industrial
espionage occurring internationally
can seek the powerful remedy of domestic exclusion of the product.36
Tianrui also set the bar low in
terms of establishing domestic industry for trade secret violations. In
TianRui the mere fact of importing
wheels that would compete with the
complainants primary business—not
with the exact product in question—
was suicient to establish the nexus
required. hus, domestic industry
seems easier to prove on substance for
trade secret violations than for patent
infringement.
To be sure, the party still has to
prove a nexus between the product
and the substantial injury, but with
Tianrui the ITC seemed to be relaxing
this requirement, meaning only that
there is some domestic industry of the
complainant that will be harmed by
the importation of the good that has
beneited from the misappropriation
abroad. hus, the nexus requirement
seems a tenuous limitation at best.
Parties considering the ITC should
not enter into actions lightly. Trials, while fast, are costly, requiring
thousands of billable hours to prepare
and submit mountains of discovery
requests, responses, and exhibits. Parties generally work non-stop during
the year-to-year-and-a-half window
May/June 2013
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they have, attempting to prove their
cases successfully.
Still, highly skilled counsel will
generally be worth the investment,
as a successful case could turn
a trade secret violation into the
right to exclude products from the
U.S. market entirely. At the least it
provides a new bargaining chip to
desperate parties attempting to enforce intellectual property violations
within Chinese borders.

13.

14.
15.
16.

Conclusion
As shown above, substantively and
procedurally, the ITC affords a number of distinct advantages over district and state court litigation when it
comes to trade secret violations. The
ability to turn a backward-looking
tort for damages into a forwardlooking right to exclude nationwide
(including, perhaps, downstream
products) means that parties can, in
the future, protect product lines and
intellectual property indefinitely as a
trade secret, and then seek to exclude
from the U.S. any misappropriator’s
products. FDLI
Literally, 四面八方. The translation “four faces, eight places” is a
simpliied translation of this Chinese
chengyu (成语), or four-character
idiom left over from ancient times.
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Id. at passim.
9.
See investigation statistics, USITC
website; see Part X, infra.
10. At least in theory.
11. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (2012).
12. See 7 pat. L. fUndaMentaLs § 21:42
(2nd ed. 2012) (“it has long been
recognized that ‘unfair competition’
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under § 337 has a broader purview.”).
See Jonathan R.K. Stroud, Reviewing
the American University Law Review
on Extraterritoriality, ITCTLA 337
Rptr., Summer Associate Ed. 2012.
Subsection (a)(1)(A). Id. at (a)(1)(A).
See (a)(3), which explicitly excludes
section (a)(1)(A) from its purview.
Scholars have commented on the
unique nature of the USITC’s § 337
requirement: “Undeterred by international criticism, the United States
continues to limit § 337 to complainants that have a domestic industry.
The domestic industry requirement is
unique to the United States.” Thomas
A. Broughan, III, Modernizing S 337’s
Domestic Industry Requirement for the
Global Economy, 19 fed. CIRCUIt B.J.
41, 59–60 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
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Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A)(E) (2006) (outlawing unfair trade
practices), with 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)-(4)
(2006) (likewise outlawing unfair
trade practices).
Certain Processes for the Manufacture of Skinless Sausage Casings and
Resulting Product, Inv. No. 337-TA148/169, USITC Pub. 1624, at 244
(December 1984). Many other cases
have held the same. For instance,
“Misappropriation of trade secrets is
an unfair method of competition or unfair act which falls within the purview
of § 337.” IN THE MATTER OF CERTAIN FLOPPY DISK DRIVES AND
COMPONENTS THEREOF INITIAL
DETERMINATION, USITC Inv. No.
337-TA-203, 1985 WL 303605, *14
(USITC) (citing In re Von Clemm, 108
U.S.P.Q. 371 (C.C.P.A. 1955); Certain
Processes for the Manufacture of Skinless Sausage Casings, Inv. No. 337TA-148/169, at 243-48 (Jul. 31, 1984);
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Production of Copper Rod, Inv. No.
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33–35 (5th ed. 2010) (explaining that
trade secret violations originated from
Roman cause of action actio servi corrupti (literally, an action for corrupting the slave)).
Univ. Computing Co. v. Lykes–
Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 539
(5th Cir. 1974).
See generally Andrew F. Popper,
Beneiciaries of Misconduct: A Direct
Approach to IT Theft, M aRqUette
InteLL. pRop. L. R ev. (forthcoming
winter 2012). The Author contributed
research to this publication.
Certain Cast Steel Ry. Wheels, Processes for Mfg. or Relating to Same
& Certain Prods. Containing Same,
Inv. No. 337-TA-665, USITC Pub.
4265, at 1–2 (Feb. 16, 2010) (Limited
Exclusion Order), aff’d, TianRui Grp.
Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661
F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011). See
also Matthew A. Werber, Using the
International Trade Commission to
Address Trade Secret Misappropriation Occurring Abroad, Lexology,
August 24, 2012 (“The Federal Circuit
caught the attention of the ITC and
trade secret litigators alike when it
ruled in TianRui Group Co. v. ITC that
the ITC can exercise its jurisdiction
over acts of misappropriation occurring entirely in China.”)
Statistics compiled from U.S. International Trade Commission, Press Room,
Section 337 Statistical Information,
http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/337_
stats.htm (Last visited April 2, 2013).)
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visited April 2, 2013).
Id.
Inv. No. 337-TA-849 (2012), noticed in
77 Fed. Reg. 38,083 (June 26, 2012).
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Id.
Gary M. Hnath, Section 337 Investigations at the US International Trade
Commission Provide A Powerful Remedy Against Misappropriation of Trade
Secrets, INTELL. PROP. & TECH.
L.J., June 2010 at 1, 1.
See ChRIs sCott gRahaM, pRoteCtIng
tRade seCRets 52–55 (2012).
“Exclusion orders are enforced,
in part, by U.S. Customs Border
Protection (“CBP”) oficials who are

www.fdli.org

Need Regulatory Help?
instructed to identify articles subject
to the exclusion order and prevent
their entry into the U.S. While not a
monetary award, an exclusion order is
nevertheless a very powerful remedy.
In TianRui, for example, the Commission issued an exclusion order prohibiting entry of the subject TainRui steel
railway wheels for a period of ten
years.” Matthew A. Werber, Using the
International Trade Commission to
Address Trade Secret Misappropriation Occurring Abroad, LexoLogy,
August 24 2012.
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